boundaries obviously shrinks to zero as ε goes to zero. We say that signals exhibit vanishing likelihood if the density of consumers at the posterior belief distribution's boundaries goes to zero.
Consumers who receive signals that induce such extreme posterior beliefs are those consumers who are likely to go against a herd and purchase the less popular product. We refer to such consumers as nonconformists. With this interpretation in mind the property of "vanishing likelihood" serves as a measure of the prevalence of nonconformism. More particularly, we associate vanishing likelihood with a negligible level of nonconformism while signals that do not exhibit vanishing likelihood are associated with significant nonconformism.
When society herds, each agent follows in the footsteps of his predecessors and thus, intuitively, one expects nonconformism (when signals do not exhibit vanishing likelihood) to induce learning. Our main result shows that the opposite occurs: in the presence of strategic pricing asymptotic learning holds if and only if signals have the vanishing likelihood property.
The full paper can be found at http://bit.ly/ec19aks. 
